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1 INTRODUCTION
Crowdfunding is increasingly attracting attention,
most recently for its potential to provide equity
funding to start-ups. Providing funding to young
and innovative firms is particularly relevant given
their importance for job creation and economic
growth (OECD, 2013; Haltiwangner et al, 2011;
Stangler and Litan, 2009). In addition, at a time
when banking intermediation is under pressure
(Sapir and Wolff, 2013), it is important for Euro-
pean Union policymakers to further explore alter-
native forms of financial intermediation. But
questions remain about the appropriateness of
crowdfunding for providing seed and early stage
equity finance to new ventures and how this
market could be developed and regulated.
While there is growing hype around crowdfunding,
there are also many wrong perceptions. The bulk
of crowdfunding is for philanthropic projects (in
the form of donations), consumer products often
for creative ventures such as music and film (in
the form of pre-funding orders) and lending. Equity
crowdfunding, sometimes called crowdinvesting
is relatively new and currently comprises the
smallest part of the crowdfunding market. How-
ever, it is currently more active in Europe than in
other regions.
2 GROWTH OF CROWDFUNDING
Crowdfunding can be defined as the collection of
funds, usually through a web platform, from a
large pool of backers to fund an initiative. Two
fundamental elements underpin this model and
both have been enabled by the development of
the internet. First, by substantially reducing
transaction costs, the internet makes it possible
to collect small sums from a large pool of funders:
the crowd. The aggregation of many small
contributions can result in considerable amounts
of capital. Second, the internet makes it possible
EQUITY CROWDFUNDING Karen E. Wilson and Marco Testoni
to directly connect funders with those seeking
funding, without an active intermediary.
Crowdfunding platforms assume the role of
facilitators of the match.
While people tend to talk about crowdfunding in
general, the crowdfunding phenomenon encom-
passes quite heterogeneous financing models.
There are four main types:
• Donation-based, in which funders donate to
causes that they want to support with no
expected compensation (ie philanthropic or
sponsorship-based incentive).
• Reward-based, in which funders’ objective for
funding is to gain a non-financial reward such
as a token gift or a product, such as a first edi-
tion release.
• Lending-based (crowd lending), in which fun-
ders receive fixed periodic income and expect
repayment of the original principal investment.
• Equity-based (usually defined as crowdinvest-
ing), in which funders receive compensation in
the form of fundraiser’s equity-based revenue
or profit-share arrangements. In other words,
the entrepreneur decides how much money he
or she would like to raise in exchange for a per-
centage of equity and each crowdfunder
receives a pro-rata share (usually ordinary
shares) of the company depending on the frac-
tion of the target amount they decide to
commit. For example, if a start-up is trying to
raise €50,000 in exchange for 20 percent of its
equity and each crowdfunder provides €500 (1
percent of €50,000), the crowdfunder will
receive 0.20 percent (1 percent of 20 percent)
of the company’s equity.
The four models vary in terms of complexity and
level of uncertainty. The donation-based model is
the simplest. Legally the transaction takes the
form of a donation. The risk is that the project does
not achieve its declared goals, but the backer does
03
BR U EGE L
POLICY
CONTRIBUTIONKaren E. Wilson and Marco Testoni  EQUITY CROWDFUNDING
has been North America (and mostly the US where
the concept of crowdfunding started) with 60
percent of the market volume, followed by Europe,
which has 36 percent.
Equity crowdfunding is the smallest category of
the overall industry and had a CAGR of about 50
percent from 2010 to 2012. Most of that growth
was through European crowdfunding platforms
because legal barriers currently prevent the devel-
opment of equity crowdfunding in the US (see Box
2 on page 11). As a result, Europe is currently the
leading market for this financing model (see fur-
ther discussion in section 4).
While in Europe equity crowdfunding is growing,
the understanding of its risks and opportunities is
still limited. We first assess the potential role of
equity crowdfunding in the overall seed and early-
stage financing market. Second, we point out the
potential risks of equity crowdfunding. Third, we
not expect any material or financial return from the
transaction. Equity crowdfunding is the most com-
plex. From a legal standpoint, the funder buys a
stake in the company, the value of which must be
estimated. Moreover, the level of uncertainty in
equity crowdfunding is much greater compared to
the other models because it concerns the entre-
preneur’s ability to generate equity value in the
company, which is extremely difficult to assess.
Overall, these complexities pose problems that
are distinct and more fundamental than those of
the other crowdfunding models. These complexi-
ties require special attention from policymakers,
as this Policy Contribution will discuss.
In general, crowdfunding is experiencing
exponential growth globally. In the period 2009-
13, the compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of
the funding volumes was about 76 percent with
an estimated total funding volume of $5.1bn in
2013. In terms of geography, the biggest market
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ners, and aims at investments in firms in early
to expansion stages. The source of capital
pooled into venture capital funds is predomi-
nately institutional investors. Venture capital
firms typically invest around $3m and $5m per
round in a company.
The contributions of angel investors and venture
capital firms are not limited to the provision of
finance. They are actively involved in monitoring
the companies in which they invest and often pro-
vide critical resources such as industry expertise
and a valuable network of contacts (Gorman and
Sahlman, 1989; Baum and Silverman, 2004; Hsu,
2004).
The importance of angel investors  has increased
in recent years given the difficulties young inno-
vative firms face in securing finance from other
channels (Wilson, 2011). As a result of the finan-
cial crisis, banks are even more reluctant to fund
young firms because of their perceived riskiness
and lack of collateral (Wilson and Silva, 2013).
Meanwhile, venture capital firms are focusing
more on later-stage investments and have left a
significant funding gap at the seed and early
stage. Angel investors, particularly those invest-
ing through groups or syndicates, are active in this
investment segment and thus help to fill this
increasing financing gap.
Equity crowdfunding departs from the models of
traditional angel investors and venture capital
firms because transactions are intermediated by
an online platform. Some platforms play a more
active role in screening and evaluating companies
than others (see section 4). Also, their role during
the investment and post-investment stages can
EQUITY CROWDFUNDING Karen E. Wilson and Marco Testoni
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describe the state of this nascent industry con-
sidering both the innovations introduced by
market players and existing regulation. Finally, we
discuss the implications of our analysis for policy.
3 THE SEED AND EARLY-STAGE FINANCING
MARKET
Equity crowdfunding is receiving attention from
policymakers as a potential source of funds for
start-ups, a segment of the economy that has lim-
ited access to finance. Young firms have no track
record and often lack assets to be used as guar-
antees for bank loans. In addition, information
asymmetries make it difficult for investors to iden-
tify and evaluate the potential of these firms.
Traditionally there have been three sources of
equity funding for young innovative firms:
founders, family and friends; angel investors; and
venture capitalists.
• The most common source of funding for new
ventures is the founders’ own capital, even if
that is funded through credit cards. Family and
friends sometimes also provide finance to the
entrepreneur in the first phases of develop-
ment of the start-up (seed stage).
• Angel investors are experienced entrepreneurs
or business people that choose to invest their
own funds into a new venture. They typically
invest in seed and early stage ventures with
amounts ranging from $25,000 to $500,000.
Angels invest not only for the potential finan-
cial return, but in many cases to give back by
helping other entrepreneurs. 
• Venture capital is considered ‘professional’
equity, in the form of a fund run by general part-
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Figure 3: The equity crowdfunding process
Source: Bruegel.
Karen E. Wilson and Marco Testoni  EQUITY CROWDFUNDING
BR U EGE L
POLICY
CONTRIBUTION
05
1. Nevertheless, this
distribution might not
reflect simply the
investment preferences of
the crowd. Legal constraints
currently provide upper
limits to the capital that can
be raised from non-
qualified investors. See
section 4.
2. Seedrs is an equity
crowdfunding platform
based in the United
Kingdom. It allows users to
invest as little as £10 into
the start-ups. In the first 18
months since its launch in
July 2012, Seedrs collected
more than €6.8 million
through 56 funded
campaigns and counted
more than 29,000 users.
3. In particular, the Seed
Enterprise Investment
Scheme (SEIS) launched by
the UK government in April
2012.
Another characteristic that equity crowdfunding
has in common with angel investors is that finan-
cial return is not the sole motive for an investment.
Crowdfunders might also derive social and emo-
tional benefits from financing a company. In other
words, they are likely to be motivated to provide
funding to a company to be connected with an
entrepreneurial venture that shares their own
values, vision or interests. A survey of Seedrs2
users revealed that the three top motivations for
investors to fund start-ups are the desire to help
new businesses get off the ground, the ability to
exploit tax reliefs3, and the hope of achieving
meaningful financial returns (Seedrs, 2013).
In terms of investment preferences, venture cap-
itals tend to concentrate on technology-based
companies, which typically are high-risk/high-
return investments. Angel investors tend to invest
in a wider range of sectors and geographies, cov-
ering some investment segments in which ven-
ture capital typically would not invest (Wilson,
2011). Because the crowd might encompass
quite heterogeneous investment motives, the
investment spectrum of equity crowdfunding can
be even broader. For example, Seedrs users have
invested in sectors as diverse as food and drink,
high-tech, art and music, fashion and apparel, real
estate and many others (Seedrs, 2014). The fact
that crowdinvestors derive also non-financial ben-
efits from the investment implies that they might
also be willing to accept higher risks or lower
returns than an investor seeking to maximise
financial returns (Collins and Pierrakis, 2012).
Unlike venture capital and angel investment,
equity crowdfunding requires entrepreneurs to
publicly disclose their business idea and strategy.
This early information disclosure might be harmful
for firms with an innovative business model that
can be easily imitated (Hemer, 2011; Agrawal et
al, 2013; Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2014a).
Therefore, crowdfunding might be most beneficial
for start-ups that can protect their intellectual cap-
ital through means other than secrecy, or for start-
ups whose business is not particularly innovative. 
Another common element shared by business
angels and crowdinvestors is that neither type of
financing model necessarily involves an active
financial intermediary that makes the investment
vary dramatically. While there is a great deal of
variation among the approaches adopted by the
different platforms (Collins and Pierrakis, 2012),
equity crowdfunding platforms generally follow
the phases described in Figure 3.
Platforms usually charge companies a fee, typi-
cally 5-10 percent of the amount raised, plus
sometimes a fixed up-front fee. Some platforms
also charge fees to investors that are either fixed
or a percentage of the amount invested or a per-
centage of the profit for investment. For example,
Crowdcube charges entrepreneurs 5 percent plus
a £1,750 fee for successful fund raising. Symbid
charges entrepreneurs a €250 registration fee
plus 5 percent of the amount raised and charges
investors 2.5 percent of the amount invested.
Seedrs charges entrepreneurs 7.5 percent of the
amounts raised and charges investors 7.5 percent
of the profits from the investment.
To understand how equity crowdfunding can com-
plement the market incumbents in seed and
early-stage finance, we have to consider charac-
teristics such as investment size, investment
motives, the risk/return profile, the investment
model and investor characteristics.
Figure 4 shows the funding per project in equity-
based crowdfunding. Compared to the other
sources of finance described above, we can see
that equity crowdfunding mostly operates in the
financing segment covered by angel investors1.
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decisions. Venture capital firms pool financial
commitments from institutional investors into
funds and then select a portfolio of companies
over time in which they invest. For angel investors
and crowdinvestors, the decision to finance a
company is ultimately made by the individual
investor. Some equity crowdfunding platforms
pool the funds of the crowd into an investment
vehicle and act towards the company as the rep-
resentative of the interests of the crowd. However,
even in this case the platform does not act as a
financial intermediary in portfolio management for
the crowd, and the decision to invest in a specific
company is taken by the individual investor.
While angel investors are typically high net worth
individuals who are sophisticated investors,
crowdinvestors are individuals that might or might
not have experience and knowledge of financial
markets and early-stage financing. Moreover,
while angel investors tend to invest locally, crowd-
investors might invest in start-ups that are quite
distant from them. Agrawal et al (2011) show that
the average distance between a revenue-sharing
crowdfunding platform's entrepreneurs and
investors was approximately 3,000 miles (4,828
km). According to their study, only 13.5 percent of
the investors provided funds to entrepreneurs
within 50 km.
Table 1 summarises the key characteristics of
equity crowdfunders, angel investors and venture
capitalists, highlighting their similarities and dif-
ferences.
Overall, equity crowdfunding can provide a com-
plementary channel through which start-ups can
obtain finance. In addition, equity crowdfunding
can provide some advantages by fully exploiting
the potential of the internet.
For example, crowdfunding allows a start-up to
gain online visibility in the first phases of its devel-
opment. As crowdinvestors are also potential con-
sumers, an entrepreneur can benefit from
crowdfunding through early advertisement of its
 Table 1: Key characteristics of equity crowdfunders, business angels and venture capitalists
Equity crowdfunders Business angels Venture capitalists
Background Many different backgrounds,
many  have no investment
experience
Former entrepreneurs Finance, consulting, some
from industry
Investment approach Investing own money Investing own money Managing a fund and/or
investing other people’s money
Investment stage Seed and early stage Seed and early stage Range of seed, early-stage and
later-stage but increasingly
later-stage
Investment instruments Common shares Common shares (often due
regulatory restrictions)
Preferred shares
Deal flow Through web platform Through social networks
and/or angel groups/networks
Through social networks as
well as proactive outreach
Due diligence Conducted by individual, if at
all, and sometimes by the
platform
Conducted by angel investors
based on their own experience
Conducted by staff in VC firm
sometimes with the
assistance of outside firms
(law firms, etc.)
Geographic proximity of
investments
Investments made online:
most investors are quite
distant from the venture
Most investments are local
(within a few hours’ drive)
Invest nationally and
increasingly internationally
with local partners
Post investment role Depends on the individual
investor, but most remain pas-
sive. Some platforms repre-
sent the interests of the crowd
Active, hands-on Board seat, strategic
Return on investment
and motivations for
investment
Financial return important but
not the only reason for
investing
Financial return important but
not the main reason for angel
investing
Financial return critical. The VC
fund must provide decent
returns to existing investors to
enable them to raise a new fund
(and therefore stay in business)
Source: adapted from Wilson (2011).
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‘Despite the expertise of professional investors, the risk of investing in start-ups remains high.
There is a misconception about success rates and returns on investment in start-ups and the
average individual is not aware of the risks.’
products and by obtaining information on poten-
tial market demand and product preferences
(Agrawal et al, 2013; Hornuf and Schwienbacher,
2014a). This early assessment of demand could
help to reduce inefficient investments in start-ups
with weak business potential.
Compared with traditional angel investing transac-
tions that rely mostly on word-of-mouth, crowd-
funding can improve the efficiency of the market
by enabling faster and better investor-company
matches. Moreover, geographical factors that might
affect traditional forms of seed and early-stage
financing might be less important in crowdfunding
(Mollick, 2013a; Agrawal et al, 2011 and 2013).
Finally, the crowdfunding industry is well-posi-
tioned to benefit from the so-called 'big data' par-
adigm (Agrawal et al, 2013). Being online-based,
crowdfunding deals leave data trails on investors,
entrepreneurs, companies and deals, unlike angel
investment and even most venture capital trans-
actions. Through time, the analysis of this data
could enable crowdfunding platforms to provide
better matches between investors and  compa-
nies and maximise the correlation between the
crowd and product demand.
4 RISKS IN EQUITY CROWDFUNDING 
Seed and early-stage financing can be high risk
but with the hope of a high return. Eurostat data4
show that in EU the one-year survival rate for all
enterprises created in 2009 was 81 percent, while
the five-year survival rate of all enterprises started
in 2005 was only 46 percent. Despite the
expertise of professional investors, the risk of
investing in start-ups remains high. Shikhar
Ghosh, senior lecturer at Harvard Business School,
analysed data from more than 2,000 US
companies that received venture financing and
found that about 30-40 percent of them fail, while
more than 95 percent fail to generate the expected
return on investment (WSJ, 2012). There is a
misconception about success rates and returns
on investment in start-ups (Shane, 2008) and the
average individual is not aware of the risks.
The characteristics of crowdfunding can make
investments in seed and early-stage companies
even riskier. Information asymmetry problems
common to seed and early-stage financing are
exacerbated in equity crowdfunding. Below we
describe some of the issues that might arise in
each phase of the investment.
Selection and valuation
Before investing in a company, business angels
and venture capitalists routinely perform due dili-
gence to assess the potential value of the firm.
This can be costly in terms of time and resources.
However, evidence shows that due diligence is a
major determinant in achieving returns on the
investment (Wiltbanks and Boeker, 2007). This
expense is often justified in light of the consider-
able size of such investments. Because their
investments are relatively small, crowdinvestors
have less incentive to perform due diligence.
Moreover, individual investors have the possibil-
ity of free-riding on the investment decisions of
others. This implies that the crowdfunding com-
munity may systematically underinvest in due
diligence (Agrawal et al, 2013).
Crowdfunders also likely lack the expertise and
skills to perform adequate due diligence. Since
everyone is able to join, the crowd often includes
non-professional investors, who do not have the
knowledge or capabilities to properly estimate the
value of a company.
Finally, company valuation performed by a crowd
might be affected by social biases and herding
behaviour5. Evidence suggests that a crowdfun-
der’s investment decision might be affected by
those of the other investors (Agrawal et al, 2011;
Kuppuswamy and Bayus, 2013). Moreover, dif-
ferent studies have found that both the crowd and
entrepreneurs are typically initially overoptimistic
about potential outcomes (Mollick, 2013b;
Agrawal et al, 2013).
4. Business demography
statistics, available at:
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europ
a.eu/statistics_explained/in
dex.php/Business_demog-
raphy_statistics.
5. However, valuation per-
formed by the crowd might
also benefit from the so-
called ‘wisdom of crowds’
(Surowiecki, 2005). Accord-
ing to this theory, a crowd
could make efficient invest-
ment decisions because
individual decision-making
errors could cancel each
other out on the aggregate
level (Hornuf and Schwien-
bacher, 2014a; Agrawal et
al, 2013).
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Investment
Equity crowdfunding often relies on standardised
contracts that are provided by the portal. However,
equity investment into seed and early-stage firms
often requires tailored contracts to align the inter-
ests of the entrepreneur to those of the investor.
For example, venture capital and business angels
use various covenants in their contracts, such as
anti-dilution provisions that protect against down-
rounds6, tag-along rights7 that facilitate exit oppor-
tunities, and liquidation preferences that secure
higher priority in the distribution of value (Hornuf
and Schwienbacher, 2014a). Moreover, in order to
reduce risk exposure and increase control over the
entrepreneur’s behaviour, seed and early-stage
investors often split their investments into
tranches that are conditional on the attainment of
defined milestones. All of these mechanisms are
difficult to replicate in the crowdfunding setting.
Another strategy applied by venture capitalists
and business angels is to invest in a portfolio of
companies in order to diversify their risk. Equity
crowdfunders might be able to replicate this strat-
egy given that crowdfunding platforms expose
them to a variety of projects. However, non-pro-
fessional investors might not be aware of the
importance of this strategy and could potentially
concentrate all their investments in a single ven-
ture. For example, Seedrs statistics show that 41
percent of investors hold only one company in
their portfolio (Seedrs, 2014).
Moreover, crowdfunders might not be able to par-
ticipate in follow-on investment rounds. The fail-
ure to do so might mean that the investor’s shares
get diluted, thus reducing their chances to attain a
positive return from the investment.
Post-investment support and monitoring
As we have described, business angels and ven-
ture capitalists not only provide finance to start-
ups, but are also actively involved in increasing
the value of the company. While the crowd could
potentially provide active support to the venture,
there are reasons to believe that this support can
be less valuable than that provided by traditional
seed and early-stage financiers. Given their typi-
cal small level of investment, crowdfunders have
less incentive to provide active support to the
company because the return for their action is
lower (Agrawal et al, 2013). However, if too many
investors choose to become active, it could be
excessively costly for a small firm to manage a
crowd of investors that want to participate. This is
particularly relevant considering that the venture
has limited ability to select its crowdinvestors.
Moreover, high information asymmetry also char-
acterises the post-investment phase, thus limit-
ing the monitoring potential of the crowd. One of
the elements contributing to the increase in infor-
mation asymmetry is geographical distance
between funders and the entrepreneur. While this
characteristic enables backers to attain access to
a wider pool of entrepreneurs (and visa-versa), it
also entails higher monitoring costs. Literature
suggests that distance increases the costs that an
investor must bear in order to monitor the venture
(Grote and Umber, 2007). This is in line with the
observation that venture capital funds invest pre-
dominantly in firms close to them (Lerner, 1995).
Finally, the lack of repeated interactions reduces
the potential of reputation as a mechanism to
incentivise the entrepreneur to behave in line with
the interests of the investor (Agrawal et al, 2013).
In other online marketplaces, such as eBay,
participants have a low incentive to misbehave
because, if they do, they might, in effect, be
prevented from participating in the market in the
future because of the feedback and ratings
mechanisms. Since sourcing equity finance
through the internet is often a one-time event for
an entrepreneur, the incentives for behaving
correctly are lower, which can lead to potential
fraud. More active crowdfunding platforms screen
companies. However, not all platforms have the
same standards.
Exit
The lack of adequate monitoring is particularly
worrisome in a setting in which investments often
take 5-10 years or more to produce a return, if any.
Crowd investors might not appreciate that long
periods are necessary for these investments to
either succeed or fail, or that most of these invest-
ments are unlikely to yield any return. Moreover,
equity investments are mostly long-term illiquid
6. A round of financing in
which investors purchase
stock from a company at a
lower valuation than the
valuation placed upon the
company by earlier
investors.
7. A contractual obligation
used to protect a minority
shareholder. If a majority
shareholder sells his or her
stake, then the minority
shareholder has the right to
join the transaction and sell
his or her minority stake in
the company.
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8. www.antabio.com.
9. http://blog.seedmatch.de/
2013/08/16/betandsleep-
stellt-den-geschaeftsbetrieb-
ein/.
10. https://www.com-
panisto.com/en/news/vorl%
C3%A4ufige-insolvenz-der-
sportrade-gmbh-article-
469.
assets. Therefore, it is important that non-profes-
sional investors are adequately informed about
the illiquid characteristics of this asset class.
For equity investments to provide a return to
investors, a positive 'exit' must take place at some
point. This can be through an initial public offering
(IPO) or, as more often the case, through a merger
or acquisition (M&A). Unfortunately, these posi-
tive exits became increasingly rare during the
financial crisis. In Europe, EVCA data (2013)
shows that only 15 percent of venture capital exits
in 2012 (in terms of number of companies) were
through trade sales, and even fewer, 5 percent,
were IPOs. These numbers are clearly lower than
pre-crisis (2007) figures that pointed to 22 per-
cent of exits through trade sales and 8 percent
through IPOs.
For angel investments and equity crowdfunding
investments, the path to a positive exit can be
longer and even less likely. IPOs and M&As do not
happen by chance. Venture capitalists and the
firms themselves often have an exit strategy in
mind from the beginning and proactively work
towards making it a reality over a long period
(Wilson and Silva, 2013). 
In conclusion, the lack of adequate pre-invest-
ment screening and due diligence, weaker invest-
ment contracts and poorer post-investment
support and monitoring can make the risk associ-
ated with equity crowdfunding significantly higher
than the risk usually borne by business angels
and venture capitals. Moreover, while the poten-
tial for fraud is exacerbated in the equity crowd-
funding setting, information asymmetry makes
investments in the start-ups of even well-inten-
tioned entrepreneurs riskier, since the compe-
tence of the entrepreneur and the quality of the
business plan cannot be properly assessed.
While there are some successful equity crowd-
funding cases (such as the biotech start-up
Antabio8 in France, which succeeded in producing
a positive return for its investors) and failure cases
(such as the liquidation of betandsleep9 or
sporTrade10 in Germany), the industry still lacks a
sufficient track record to assess its ability to
create value for both investors and entrepreneurs.
5 CROWDFUNDING PLATFORMS AND THE
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 
The issues we have raised demonstrate the greater
exposure that equity crowdfunding market has
compared to other forms of seed and early-stage
investment. In particular, adverse selection prob-
lems could increase the cost of capital up to the
point at which only low-quality ventures will even-
tually choose to seek financing through crowd-
funding, while high-quality ventures will continue
to secure venture capital or angel investor financing
(Agrawal et al, 2013). Competition between plat-
forms and between the crowdfunding industry and
traditional financing is pushing platforms to design
innovative solutions to avoid the unintended con-
sequence of creating a ‘market for lemons’.
Overall, the main limitation of equity crowdfund-
ing is that it allows a non-professional investor,
who might lack the incentive and/or capabilities to
adequately assess and monitor a start-up, to
make an investment. Efforts to address this limi-
tation to date have included the introduction of an
intermediary between the crowd and the company
that is able to perform these tasks, or the reduc-
tion of the crowd to only qualified investors.
The first approach involves the provision of an
active intermediary that could act as a represen-
tative of the interests of the crowd in performing
due diligence and monitoring start-ups. Following
this trend, many platforms are active in performing
due diligence, while others operate a nominee and
management system in which they represent the
interests of investors with the crowdfunded busi-
ness (eg Seedrs). Another example is provided by
platforms such as MyMicroInvest in Belgium,
which allows investors to co-invest with an expe-
rienced business angel. In this case, the crowd
benefits from the financial contracting skills and
from the post-investment monitoring of an expe-
rienced active investor. While this approach pro-
vides some benefits, it also entails some risks: by
leveraging the investment decisions of a business
angel, this mechanism may increase the risk
propensity of the angel, thus biasing his or her
investment decisions.
A second approach is to reduce the crowd, by
limiting the investment to a restricted group of
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people, possibly accredited investors, each
contributing more capital than the average crowd
investor. In this case, crowdinvesting would more
closely resemble angel investor groups than the
typical crowdfunding model. Examples of this
model are CircleUp and FundersClub in the US or
Seedups based in Ireland, whose offers are
restricted to accredited investors. Other examples
are platforms that impose high investment
minimums, thus reducing the crowd to a few
investors. Finally, some platforms (such as Seedrs
and Crowdcube in the UK) require crowdinvestors
to pass a test before investing in a company, to
certify that they are sufficiently aware of the
investment risk.
The efficacy of these measures needs to be evalu-
ated and appropriate policies should take into
account these assessments. Moreover, while the
market gives incentives to platforms to adopt the
best practice, some platforms could deviate from
the best practices because of lack of long-term
vision, incompetence or other hidden interests
(Griffin, 2012). The financial crisis showed that
leaving the financial market to self-regulate can be
costly. Many of these crowdinvestors could lose
their money before the market has time to self-cor-
rect and force out inadequate platform models.
Crowdfunding platforms have an incentive to build
a good reputation by securing attractive deals for
their crowds, since in the long run reputation
results in market-share gains. Apart from this rep-
utational incentive, platforms differ in the struc-
ture of fees they derive from the deals. As
described in section 2, most of the platforms
derive revenues as a percentage of the amount
raised, while only a few (eg Seedrs) derive mone-
tary benefit from a successful exit by imposing a
fee as a percentage of investor’s profits. This typ-
ical fee structure implies that platforms derive
monetary incentive to close deals while there are
only reputational incentives to provide success-
ful deals in the long run. If long-run reputational
incentives are lower than short-term monetary
incentives, conflicts of interest could arise and
platforms might downplay investment risk to the
crowd in order to secure deals. In light of this
potential conflict of interest, a supervisory body
for crowdfunding platforms is probably desirable.
From a legal standpoint, equity crowdfunding is
currently possible in some jurisdictions by exploit-
ing exemptions to existing securities regulations
(Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2014b). Securities
laws generally require an issuer to register with
the national securities authority and to comply
with strict reporting standards in order to gain
access to the general public. These requirements
are prohibitively expensive for small firms, which
are the typical beneficiaries of crowdfunding. 
In the EU, exemptions as defined in national regu-
lations pertaining to prospectus and registration
requirements, allow start-ups to gain access to the
general public through equity crowdfunding
(Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2014b). Exemptions
include the maximum amount that can be offered
to the public, the maximum number of investors
to whom the offer is made, the minimum contri-
bution imposed on investors and whether the offer
is made to ‘qualified’ or ‘accredited’ investors.
While these exemptions to existing securities leg-
islation allow small firms access to the general
public for financing, they also imply weaker pro-
tections for investors.
EU member states have adopted different practices
on whether the equity crowdfunding platform must
register as an investment intermediary or obtain a
bank license. For example, in Germany, crowdin-
vesting platforms explicitly stating that they do not
provide any investment advice or brokerage serv-
ice have no obligation to provide any documenta-
tion in terms of advisory records or to act in the
interest of the investor (Dapp and Laskawi, 2014).
As a result, most German platforms are not regis-
tered as investment intermediaries (ECN, 2013). In
the UK, platforms are regulated by the Financial
Conduct Authority (FCA) (ECN, 2013; Hornuf and
Schwienbacher, 2014b). In France, equity crowd-
funding platforms such as Wiseed, Anaxago,
Finance Utile and SmartAngels are registered as
financial investment advisers, since their activities
consist of advice in providing financing (ECN, 2013;
Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2014b).
Finally, national corporate laws can also have an
effect on equity crowdfunding (De Buysere et al,
2012; Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2014b). For
example, because they are relatively inexpensive
in most countries, closely held company types
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Box 1: EU legislation
Prospectus Directive 2010/73/EU of 24 November 2010 (amending Directive 2003/71/EC) states
that exemptions to publishing a prospectus apply if at least one of the following conditions is met:
• The offer is addressed solely to qualified investors;
• The offer is addressed to fewer than 150 natural or legal persons per member state, other than
qualified investors;
• Investors purchase securities for a total consideration of at least €100,000 per investor;
• The denomination per unit amounts to at least €100,000; 
• Or the offer of securities represents a total consideration of less than €100,000 over a 12-month
period. The Directive also states that national regulators can raise this threshold up to €5,000,000.
Accordingly, this threshold varies among member states. For example, in Italy innovative start-ups
complying with the law can offer securities of up to €5,000,000, while in Germany this value is set
to €100,000 (see ECN, 2013, and Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2014b, for an overview of the leg-
islation in different EU member states).
(eg private limited liabilities companies) are the
typical entity type chosen by start-ups. However,
in many countries these company types have lim-
itations or might be prohibited from offering equity
to new investors. Even when allowed, equity trans-
actions for these kinds of companies often require
formalities, such as notarial intervention, which
increases the costs for start-ups.
Despite the harmonising role played by Directive
2010/73/EU (Box 1), the EU remains a patchwork
of different regulations. This lack of uniformity
Box 2: US legislation
In the US, as a general rule, securities offered to the general public must be registered with the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission (SEC). A notable exemption to this rule are offers made to accred-
ited investors – individuals with a net worth of at least $1,000,000 or who have income of at least
$200,000 – who are supposed to be able to ‘fend for themselves’. Apart from this, US legislation pre-
viously allowed for few exceptions, making equity crowdfunding practically inoperable (Griffin,
2012). The situation changed on 5 April 2012 when President Obama signed into law the Jumpstart
Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act. Under this act, issuers are not required to file a registration state-
ment with the SEC or at the state level if:
• The amount raised does not exceed $1,000,000 during a 12-month period;
• The transaction is conducted through a broker or funding portal registered with the SEC;
• The amount sold to a single investor does not exceed the greater of either $2,000 or 5 percent of
the annual income or net worth of such investor if either the annual income or the net worth of the
investor is less than $100,000, and 10 percent of the annual income or net worth of such investor
if either the annual income or net worth of the investor is equal to or more than $100,000. In any
case, the maximum aggregate amount sold to a single investor shall not exceed $100,000;
• The issuer discloses the required information to potential investors. In particular, if the aggregate
target offering amount is equal to or below $100,000, issuers must provide their most recent
income tax returns and financial statements, which must be certified by the principal executive
officer of the issuer. For issues of more than $100,000 but less than $500,000, financial state-
ments must be provided and reviewed by a public accountant, who should be independent from the
issuer. Furthermore, the accountant must use professional standards and procedures for the review.
For issues of more than $500,000, audited financial statements must be provided by the issuer.
Despite the approval of the JOBS Act, this new regulation is still not active, as the SEC has not yet
implemented the specific rules. As a result of this delay, so far equity crowdfunding deals have not
taken place in the US and existing crowdinvesting portals adopted structures similar to angel-invest-
ing networks, where only accredited investors can participate.
12
BR U EGE L
POLICY
CONTRIBUTION EQUITY CROWDFUNDING Karen E. Wilson and Marco Testoni
inhibits the development of a pan-European
industry by making cross-border deals more diffi-
cult, and highlights the lack of consensus on
whether equity crowdfunding could be welfare-
enhancing or not.
6 CONSIDERATIONS FOR POLICYMAKERS
Crowdfunding can be an additional tool for provid-
ing seed and early-stage equity finance to new
ventures. However, policymakers should proceed
with caution by carefully assessing the risks of this
new financial intermediation tool. We argue that the
challenges that equity crowdfunding poses are dis-
tinct and more complex than those posed by other
forms of crowdfunding. As we have outlined, the
risks also differ from other forms of seed and early-
stage equity finance, such as angel investing and
venture capital. Equity crowdfunding can open up
additional channels for new ventures to access
finance at a time when securing funding is difficult,
but the risks, including those related to investor
protection, need to be addressed.
These risks could result from potential fraudulent
activities of start-ups or platforms or, more likely,
poor investment decisions made by unsophisti-
cated investors. The current legal framework
mainly addresses this issue by reducing the expo-
sure that individual investors can have to riskier
assets. The goal is to make sure that the investor
is able to bear a potential loss. However, as the
equity crowdfunding volumes continue to grow,
this solution does not prevent the potential loss of
significant amounts of capital.
Overall, the legal framework should not allow a
crowd of investors, who might lack the incentive
and/or the expertise to invest in a start-up, to do
so without adequate intermediation and protec-
tion. If the crowd is made up of non-qualified
investors, we argue that there should be at least
one participant that legally represents the inter-
est of the crowd in the investment in a business.
This participant could be the crowdfunding plat-
form. The crowd could also be allowed to co-invest
‘Crowdfunding can be an additional tool for providing seed and early-stage equity finance to
new ventures, but policymakers should proceed with caution by carefully assessing the risks of
this new financial intermediation tool.’
alongside professional investors. However, also in
this case, the platform should take significant
steps to protect the interests of the crowd from the
misbehaviour of other investors. Finally, in order
to monitor potential conflicts of interest of plat-
forms, supervision by national security authori-
ties is important.
Crowdfunding currently is a highly deregulated
market with little legal protection provided to fun-
ders. In the EU, some member states have intro-
duced ad-hoc legislation for crowdfunding, while
some others will introduce new laws soon. The
European Commission is currently studying
equity crowdfunding, along with the other forms
of crowdfunding, to assess its risks and opportu-
nities. In this regard, the Commission started a
public consultation late in 2013 and published a
Communication in March 2014 (EC, 2014). At this
stage, the Commission’s efforts are focused on
increasing awareness of the opportunities and
risks of crowdfunding, spreading best practice and
improving the general understanding of this grow-
ing phenomenon. The Commission is also explor-
ing the potential of a ‘quality label’ to spread good
practice and build user confidence. 
Being based online, equity crowdfunding has the
potential to contribute to a pan-European seed
and early-stage financial market to support Euro-
pean start-ups. However, in order to maximise this
benefit, harmonised policies to address equity
crowdfunding models should be adopted in
common by all member states. This approach
would maximise the benefits of equity crowd-
funding and help to reduce the risks. We urge the
Commission to work with member states to
address the current patchwork of national legal
frameworks, which constitute an obstacle to the
development of this nascent model of funding
across Europe.
Finally, legislators should take a holistic approach
in assessing the regulatory burden on the indus-
try. Corporate law in many countries imposes lim-
itations or prohibits closely held company types –
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the typical legal form chosen by start-ups – from
selling equity to new investors. These provisions
are another significant obstacle to the develop-
ment of equity crowdfunding. Corporate laws
should be harmonised and should take into
account this new financing channel for start-ups.
In addition, other financial regulations which might
interact with and have an impact on the market
should be assessed. 
In conclusion, all types of crowdfunding can pro-
vide significant and new sources of funding for
many types of organisations, ranging from chari-
ties to companies. Equity crowdfunding, however,
is more complex and requires the proper checks
and balances if it is to provide a viable channel for
financial intermediation in the seed and early-
stage market in Europe.
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